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This report contains the appraisals and recommendation regarding the abovementioned
thesis, which has been submitted for Ph.D. by Mr. Yosuke Hashidate. The committee
unanimously agreed that the thesis had reached the level suitable for Ph.D., and therefore,
Ph.D. should be given to Mr. Yosuke Hashidate. The following is a summary of the thesis
and appraisals.
This thesis consists of three essays in decision theory, especially axiomatic approaches
therein. Each of them adopts an axiomatic approach and is concerning behavioral deci-
sion theory that cannot be explained by the standard rational choice theory in economics.
The first model is concerning attribute-based inferences. Although this type of inference
is often observed in the real life, the fully rational agent with unlimited computational
capability does not have to conduct such an inference.
Consider an example of an economist who tries to book a hotel for a conference. In-
stead of checking all the information contained in the description of the hotels listed on a
website, she would pick up some features like price and the distance from the conference
site as attributes to save time. The question is how the decision maker reaches a decision
and what feature her choice has.
Yosuke paid attention to the trade-o between attributes and showed that based on
some axioms, the decision maker’s preference exhibits preference for commitment, i.e.,
the decision maker prefers the smaller choice set than the larger choice set that containes
the smaller one, which never occurs under the rational hypothesis.
In order to tackle this problem, Yosuke presented, in addition to the standard axioms,
dominance, dissatisfaction, and contemplation. Among them, dominance and contempla-
tion are the same or similar to those used in the existing literature along the same line.
The axiom of dissatisfaction is his original. Let us explain. Consider the set X of alter-
natives and a space A of menus, each of which is a subset of X. Preferences are on A.
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2Let A be a menu. Sarver (2008, Econometrica) set forth an axiom called preference for
commitment:
fpg  fqg ^ p 2 A ) A  A [ fqg:
Then Sarver came up with an represention of the form:
V(A) = max
p2A
X
u2U
"
u(p)   K[max
q2A
u(q)   u(p)]
#
;
whereU is the set of utility functions and K is a nonnegative scalar.
Yosuke modified this axiom to accomodate the attribute-based inference. Let A be the
set of attributes, and X = i2A(Xi) be the set of the profiles of probability distributions
over Xi’s. Then the axiom goes as follows.
Axiom (Dissatisfaction). For any q 2 X, if
 there exist i; j 2 A such that pi i qi for some p 2 A, and q j  j q j for
any p 2 A, and
 fpg  fqg for some p 2 A,
then A  A [ fqg.
This requires an explanation. Let us return to the example of hotel booking. Suppose
that the decision maker has a choice set A. If there is another alternative q, which is, say,
cheaper than any other hotel in A. At the same time, this hotel as a singleton fqg is weakly
worse than some hotel in A again as a singleton, i.e., fpgj. Then adding this hotel q to A
will weakly make the decision maker worse o.
With these axioms together with the standard ones, Yosuke obtains the representation
result:
A rough description of the theorem (Representation).  satisfies the set of
axioms mentioned above if and only if  has a represention of the follow-
ing form:
V(A) = max
p2A
2666664X
i2A
ui(pi)   min
2M(u(A))
X
i2A
i[max
q2A
ui(qi)   ui(pi)]
3777775 ;
where u(A) =
 
max p 2 Au(pi), the ideal option in a menu A, andM is
the set of weights over the attributes, which is relative to the ideal point.
The first term in the bracket is a simple sum of utilities from the attributes. The second
term corresponds to dissatisfaction. Given attribute i, [maxq2A ui(qi)   ui(pi)] is the term
that represents the distance between the best and the candidate in attribute i, which is
nonpositive. The decision maker tries to tune the weight  to minimize the weighted sum
of the distance, i.e., disssatisfaction.
The analysis is interesting and original. And we think this paper is publishable in a
field journal publishing axiomatic decision theory papers.
***
3The second model is related to pride (of acting altruistically) and shame and temptation
(of acting selfishly). A motivating story is the following: Mr. X and Ms. Y went for a
dinner. The dinner costs 20; 000 yen. X obtained the bill. The question is how much
X asks Y to pay. X is a poor graduate student, and he is a dictator in this occasion. X
thought:
I wish I could pay the entire amount (due to his pride).
However, she would understand if I pay this much (temptation).
Y does not make fun of me if I pay this much (shame).
This way, X cares about Y’s thinking about X’s act.
The key axiom to the axiomatizing this phenomenon is selfishness and altruism (assume
the set of agents is I = f1; 2g here):
Axiom (Selfishness and Altruism). For each j 2 f1; 2g, if A \ B = ; and
A  j B, then
A  j A [ B  j B:
This axiom exhibits a trade-o between selfishness and altruism. In fact, A 1 A [ B for
Agent 1 corresponds to temptation (selfishness), and A 2 A[ B for Agent 1 corresponds
to shame. Then together with some other axioms, the representaion is roughly given by
V(A) = max
p2A
2666664X
i2I
iu(pi)  max
2B
[11fu(p1)   u¯1(A)g + 22fu(p2)   u¯2(A)g
3777775 ;
where u¯i’s are reference points. Therefore, the term fu(p1) u¯1(A)g corresponds to reference-
dependent selfishness, and the term fu(p2)   u¯2(A)g corresponds to reference-dependent
altruism.
In terms of originality, this work is a little weaker than the first model. But, we think
this part is also publishable in a field journal.
***
The third model is concerning preference for randomization. Again, the expected utility
theory for rational decisions implies that if there are two alternatives, then the random-
ization never goes beyond the two in terms of utility as the expected utility of a mixed
lottery is always a convex combination of pure lotteries. However, we often see people
randomize their behavior. This model tries to explain this phenomenon by an axiomatic
approach.
The axiom he introduces is the following:
Axiom (Randomization). For any A; B 2 A, if for any  2 (B), there
exists  2 (A) such that  dominates , then A  B.
This is a weaker requirement than the independence axiom, allowing the decision maker
to strictly prefer a mixed lottery to any pure lotteries that constitute it. Then together
with some other axioms, Yosuke presents a representation theorem where the preference
4is represented by
V(A) = max  2 (A)
X
q2A
u(q)g(p(q)):
Notice that if g(p(q)) = p(q), then it is the standard expected utility. This axiom is weaker
than Kreps’ axiom concerning strategic rationality.
***
Behavioral decision theory would have little discipline unless there is an axiomatic
foundation. By appraising axioms, we better understand the decisions made by bounded
rational human beings. In this sense, Yosuke’s line of research is very important. Al-
though Yosuke’s results are not earth-shattering, his solid analysis and interesting repre-
sentation results are good contributions to the field. Thereby the committee unanimously
agreed to give Ph.D. to Mr. Yosuke Hashidate.
